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"IS ONE ETHIC ENOUGH?"
Dale G. Lasky
In his lectures "The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms", Thomas
Shaffer persuasively articulates his conviction that moral concerns
belong to the essence of the practice of law. This does not mean simply
that lawyers conscientiously follow their moral convictions, but that
ethical reflection should be an integral element in legal education and
legal practice. Although this paper will take issue with his lectures
at several points, this fundamental conviction is affirmed.
But Shaffer seeks to do more than restore ethical reflection to
the center of legal thought. He also argues for a necessary unity be-
tween personal moral conviction and professional practice. Little
attempt is made to outline a unitary ethic in the lecture, but
arguments are marshalled to demonstrate the inadequacy of the alter-
native and to lay a foundation on which such an ethic could be con-
structed. The antagonist of his trenchant arguments is the adversary
ethic, which Shaffer believes has become dominant in American legal
thought and practice. In its most blatant form, it is difficult to term
it an ethic, since the adversary concept justifies the exclusion of moral
concerns.
Something more than historical or theoretical interest thus
motivates the attention given in the lectures to the two kingdoms
ethic. In Shaffer's judgment the adversary ethic represents a secular-
ized version of the two kingdoms ethic.' He finds in this tradition
a rationale for separating public and private morality which today
often ends up in the exclusion of moral concerns and ethical reflec-
tion from the practice of law.
Shaffer introduces his discussion with a series of examples in-
tended to illustrate the disappearance of personal moral conviction
from public and professional practice. But the point of the examples
is confusing. They are introduced as Shaffer addresses the question
whether there is a special morality for professional life. When the
last example has been narrated, however, we are told that the illustra-
tions may only demonstrate the lack of any morality in the lives of
the professionals cited. These are clearly two different issues: whether
public responsibility requires or allows different kinds of action than
private morality and whether moral concerns are at all appropriate
to public action.
1. Thomas L. Shaffer, "The Legal Ethics of the Two Kingdoms", 15
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In each case, rigorous criticism could be levelled at the examples
without requiring the identification of personal and public morality.
The recognition that truthfulness is essential to community life would
condemn the practice of the Wall Street lawyer who employed bribery
to win his client's case.2 An exponent of the just war theory would
censure Churchill's decision to bomb Dresden because it served no
tactical purpose, indiscriminately killed non-combatants and employed
an excessive use of force.' Even the example of abortion is problematic,
since people who agree on the sanctity of life and on the moral and
legal right of innocent, defenseless life to protection disagree on the
status of fetal life.
What is more, the inability of the hawks and doves to engage
in principled ethical discussion during the Vietnam crisis provides a
strong case for distinguishing between personal and public morality.
The very lack of a living tradition on the basis of which to discuss
publicly the morality of the war compelled people to refer purely to
private moral opinions. Opponents of the war found it necessary to
appeal to private conscience, which is appropriate to pacifist convic-
tions but not directly relevant to determining the justifiability of the
war. The supporters of official policy, on the other hand, possesed
no criteria by which to evaluate how to wage a war they considered
justified.'
The case of Atticus Finch, to whom Shaffer returns repeatedly
in the lectures and to which he devotes an extended footnote, is the
most interesting. Finch was the fictional gentleman for whom there
could be no separate morality in his public life. But in the incident
related, Atticus does not struggle to make his public action conform
to his private morality. Instead, he is tempted to employ a lower stan-
dard of morality in his family affairs than in his public career.
When he turns to the more substantive treatment of the two
kindgoms ethic, Shaffer chooses Martin Luther as its primary ex-
ponent. There appear to be two reasons for this choice. The first is
2. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE. (1979), Note
especially ch. 12.
3. M. WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 160, 261, 283 (1977).
4. Walzer confesses that it was this sense of the lack of a vital tradition
that he experienced during his involvement in resistance to the Vietnam war. This
experience motivated the study which resulted in his book. It should be noted that
the term "just war" often leaves the impression that a war can be good. The just
war doctrine assumes that war is always evil and argues that only under particular
circumstances a war be justified. But even a war which has been justified (ius ad
bellum) has to be waged justly (us in bello.)
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historical, the fact that the two kingdoms ethic has often ascribed
to Luther. The second is contextual, the fact that the lectures were
presented at a law school situated in a university that operates self-
consciously in the Lutheran tradition. Later in the lectures, Shaffer
expresses second thoughts as to whether Luther really represents
a two kingdom ethic. Further, he recognizes that the theory he
criticizes may belong more to the tradition of Lutheran orthodoxy
than to Luther himself.'
To broach the topic of the two kingdoms means to enter into
a complex and highly controversial topic. Sharply divergent and even
contradictory interpretations can be found all of which appeal to
Luther for their validation. Intensive studies of the Reformer's
teaching began with the Luther renaissance of the 1920's. And the
historical study became highly existential and directly practical dur-
ing the crisis of German Protestantism in the period of the Third
Reich. Sufficient consensus has emerged from this study to raise basic
questions to Shaffer's interpretation of Luther.' The purpose of rais-
ing these questions, however, is not simply a matter of historical in-
terest. For the questions are germane to what is meant by a unitary
ethic and the relation between private and public morality.
Shaffer's ambivalent attitude toward Luther, first using him as
paradigm for a two kingdoms ethic and later questioning whether his
own "one kingdom" ethic really conflicts with the Reformer, stems
from his interpretation of Luther's two kingdom teaching. It is the
thesis of this paper that although Luther clearly emphasized a two
kingdoms doctrine, he did not develop a two kingdoms ethic. Not only
does Luther's two kingdom doctrine not formulate an ethic, it was
not primarily constructed in order to provide a theological basis for
ethics nor to define the relation of the church and the state. Rather,
from his earliest mention of the two kingdoms in lectures on the
Psalms to his mature formulation, Luther employed this teaching to
describe the human relation to God.'
When Luther spoke of the human person as a "private person"
and as the "inner man", he referred to this religious relationship. This
5. Shaffer, note 59.
6. An extended bibliography on current literature is available in U.
DUCHROW, CHRISTENHEIT UND WELTVERANTWORTUNG. (1970). In his work, Duchrow traces
the two kingdom doctrine from Paul to Luther including a comprehensive study of
Augustine and an overview of medieval thought. An anthology of contemporary perspec-
tives is available in KARL HERTZ, ed., Two KINGDOMS AND ONE WORLD (1976).
7. U. DUCHROW, supra note 6, at 461f., 475f.
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he described as the kingdom of the Gospel and as the life of faith.
Our modern usage of the term "faith", however, makes it difficult
to understand Luther's thought. For him, faith was not primarily a
term for the human side of the God-man relationship, that is, man's
response to God's action. It was a term for the total relationship. God
is the subject of the life of faith, not simply the answer to human
needs.8 The person of faith, however, is not an isolated individual,
nor does she simply live out her private life of faith in a social order.
The human person has his being in his calling, his location in the world.
The calling, not an inward, existential "moment," was for Luther the
place of decision in the life of faith.
The terms "public" and "private" have a sharply different mean-
ing in Luther's thought from the way in which Shaffer employs the
terms. For the former, the terms are neither sociological or
psychological, but theological. The term "private" refers to the rela-
tion to God which is the ultimate source of human dignity, and the
term "public" refers to the entire life of action in the world.9 This
means that for Luther all the moral life belongs to the public realm,
including both what Shaffer, following common usage, terms personal
and public morality. Luther's two kingdoms doctrine really entails a
one kingdom ethic.
The primary substantive issue Shaffer raises with respect to the
two kingdoms ethic is its implied sharp distinction between an ethic
of law and an ethic of love. The figure which dominates this discus-
sion is Reinhold Niebuhr.10 In his effort to articulate a political ethic
rooted in the Christian faith, Niebuhr distinguished clearly between
love and justice, or law, and assigned them to the private and public
spheres of life respectively.
For Niebuhr, love in its essential form refers to a self-sacrificial
disposition which is not only non-violent, but non-resistant. This love
rejects all use of force, overt or covert, in influencing the action of
another person. Throughout his writings love always represents for
8. H. OSTERGAARD-NIELSEN. SCRIPTURA SACRA ET VIVA Vox. 136 (1957).
9. U. DUCHROW, supra note 6, at 547f., 585. Because of the purpose of this paper,
it has not seemed appropriate to develop at length Luther's thought at this point.
Luther's understanding of human nature and his conception of faith corresponds closely
to what John Macmurray terms our "objective nature", that is that humans under-
stand themselves in terms of the nature of reality external to themselves. J. MAc-
MURRAY, PERSONS IN RELATION (1961), passim.
10. Shaffer cites Niebuhr along with Paul Tillich and Harvey Cox. It is dif-
ficult to understand the inclusion of Tillich, since he understood love to be related
to justice in a much more integral sense.
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Niebuhr an ideal embodied in the life of Jesus. In political relation-
ships, however, this ideal always proves ineffective since politics by
definition entails the use of coercion. Love may inform political ac-
tion, but the latter never fully embodies the former.
In contrast to Niebuhr, Luther understood love, the natural law
and just civil law to be identical. Love does not simply influence law
or the polity of the state, but is the normative content of just civil
action. The content, however, is not defined either simply by intui-
tion or by religious tradition. Instead it depends upon the exercise
of human reason, which finds its highest expression in the principle
of equity. In the world the Christian as moral subject acts as an
autonomous person who bears responsibility for her decisions. And
precisely as this autonomous subject the human is the co-worker with
God, who is finally the subject of his work and action. By the use
of reason, all humans know the material and formal causes of law
and love, even though the efficient and final causes may remain
hidden."
The difference between these two points of view is complex and
sometimes appears more terminological than substantive. For Niebuhr,
however, love can find expression fully only in the forms appropriate
to intimate personal relationships. Justice depends upon the achieve-
ment of a balance between freedom and order in power relations and
finally depends upon the use of coercion. The tension between love
and justice arises in this framework because love is defined as an
ideal. And the ideal has to be compromised in order to be effective
under the actual conditions of human existence. It is a question,
however, whether love has to be defined in such ideal terms.
Love can be defined as recognition of another human being as
a person, which implies concern for the other person for his own sake.
In the language of Gene Outka, love implies both a declaration of policy
by an agent and a viewpoint concerning another person as a neighbor.
The agent commitment implies regard for another's well-being which
is independent of the person's moral actions and character traits and
which is unalterable in that it persists in this attitude even though
the other person's behavior must be evaluated negatively. Love also
implies a viewpoint of other people as irreducibly valuable prior to
their doing anything in particular, and this valuation is made of the
person qua existent. Thus, it is the basis for the equality of persons."
Obviously both these elements, which Outka terms agent-commitment
11. See supra note 10.
12. G. OUTKA, AGAPE 9f (1972).
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and recipient evaluation belong to a full definition of love. The dif-
ferences between the traditions represented by Niebuhr and Luther
can in part be explained by their different emphasis on one of the
two elements of this full definition. Niebuhr focuses more on the agent
commitment and defines this in terms of action which avoids the use
of force and is willing to sacrifice self-interest for the sake of the
other. Luther focuses more on the valuation of the recipient as a per-
son and thus, considers the need for different kinds of action depen-
ding upon the socially defined relationship between persons.
The definition of love as recognition of another as a person seems
to accord with the foundation principle of Shaffer's one-kingdom ethic
illustrated by a series of examples in his final lecture. Shaffer
evaluates each of these examples of law practice positively because
regard for the person is normative. The fictional Daniel Webster
demonstrated that it is good for Jabez Stone simply to be a human,
Terminello was recognized as a human being who needs to com-
municate with other people, as we all do, and finally a slave is not
a chattel but a human being.
The fundamental value of the human being as a person provides
for Shaffer a basic moral principle that can be valid as the primary
norm for all moral action.'3 It provides a continuity between personal
and public morality. And this continuity provides the basis for a one
kingdom ethic. A continuity of principle, however, does not
demonstrate that the same rules of action are binding in both public
and private morality. And this seems to be the question at the center
of Shaffer's lectures.
Shaffer expresses his argument for a unified ethic most force-
fully in his assertion that a moral agent cannot be a person one mo-
ment and the doer of jobs the next. "In morals . ..only a person
acts, always a person, always and only a person."" Immediately the
question arises whether Shaffer is making a descriptive or a normative
statement. A strong case could be made for both interpretations, but
the general context of the lecture points to understanding this as a
normative judgment. The moral requirement that a person express
himself fully in his action, however, does not logically imply that the
activity itself or its product expresses the fullness of his or her per-
sonhood. This distinction can be illustrated in both the work and
theoretical reflection of Max Weber. Weber dedicated much of his
13. Shaffer, at 35.
14. Shaffer, at 25.
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scholarly activity to developing a value-free methodology for the social
sciences. The impulse for his quest of an "objective" sociology,
however, stemmed from his observation that Prussian policy with
respect to the Polish peasants often achieved the opposite of its in-
tended purpose. An effective political policy required more objective
knowledge. In carrying out such study it was necessary to bracket
values and personal interests. But Weber was quite aware that his
quest was informed by values which were broader than single-minded
dedication to value-free objectivity. In this sense, he invested the whole
of himself in his academic work, but the academic work itself did not
express his total person.15
In a similar fashion an individual may invest himself totally in
a moral action without that moral action expressing the whole of her
moral concern. The danger, against which Shaffer wants to guard,
is that the activity may become so demanding and so engaging that
the individual loses awareness of the larger dimensions of the self.
The example of Albert Speer portrays an individual who so single-
mindedly pursued the goal of being an architect that finally his en-
tire life and person was reduced to nothing other than being an
architect." This is the danger Shaffer sees in single-minded pursuit
of the adversary system of justice.
What is to be the relation between a person and the tasks he
performs? Shaffer treats this problem in terms of the relation between
a person and social institutions. If there is a difference between Shaf-
fer and the tradition represented by Luther, it would seem to lie at
this point in the discussion. Luther employed the language of calling
and office to speak of this institutional aspect of life. And it is here
that the question of the relation of private and public morality sur-
faces more clearly than in relation to the doctrine of the two kingdoms.
The language of the lectures speaks of institutions as something
which people use or which they serve. The implied independence of
people from institutions voices an understanding of persons and com-
munity which Shaffer himself apparently repudiates. A long tradition
in the West has assumed that the freedom of the individual depends
upon liberation from institutions. From the Enlightenment through
the 20th century, progress, reason and freedom were considered depen-
dent upon autonomous, self-sufficient individuals. The concern for the
freedom and autonomy of the individual was often equated with a
15. M. Weber, "Science as a Vocation" in H. H. GERTH AND C. WRIGHT MILLS,
ed., FROM MAX WEBER 129f (1958).
16. Shaffer, note 78.
1983] Lasky: Is One Ethic Enough?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1983
50 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.17
negative valuation of institutions. As a result, there emerged an in-
dividualism which combined an implicit psychology and a theory about
the relation between persons and institutions with the emphasis on
the ethical centrality of the person. 7 It was often assumed that the
individual human being possesses a given human nature to be nour-
ished and developed in society. Thus, the source and norm of per-
sonal freedom and integrity were located in the human individual. To-
day this conception is, to say the least, considered questionable. 8
This tradition produced a constricted conception of institutions,
which has had broad implications for understanding human freedom
and moral responsibility. In everyday usage, the term "institution"
has come to denote organized groupings of actions carried on in a
somewhat established and expected way-a factory, a church, or a
club. The lectures cite similar examples. These social forms, which
are also frequently termed organizations or associations, are
characterized by a structure which is voluntary, organized in terms
of promotional and administrative offices, and tend to have a known
membership. But the term "institution" has a broader meaning. It
refers to any habitualized action and meaning shared by two or more
people. Perhaps the best example of such a social institution is
language, which provides the basic instrument for sharing a common
world and a common life."5
An important difference in perspective results from these two
different conceptions of institutions. For the latter, broader usage,
institutions are fundamental to human community. Community arises
17. R. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER chs. 9 and 10 (1962).
18. One of the most widely cited contemporary works articulating an alter-
native theoretical framework for understanding human nature is that of P. BERGER
AND T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966). Their position is stated
most succinctly as follows:
There is only human nature in the sense of anthropological constants (for
example, world-openness and plasticity of instinctual structure) that delimit
and permit man's socio-cultural formations. But the specific shape into
which this humanness is molded is determined by those socio-cultural for-
mations and is relative to their numerous variations. While it is possible
to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say that man con-
structs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself.
Id. at 47.
19. In a sense, language can be termed a metainstitution because it has the
unique characteristic that an individual cannot withdraw from it and because all other
institutions find their justification and obligating character through the binding medium
of meaningful discourse. The primary resource for developing the conception of in-
stitutions here presented is the interdisciplinary work edited by H. SCHELSKY, ZUR
THEORIE DER INSTITUTION (1970)
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in and through institutions and becomes identical with them. And the
difference between broad, informal institutions and the narrower, more
highly organized forms is quantitative, not qualitative. The more nar-
row perspective views institutions as tools or instruments which a
group, or even an individual, uses for its own purposes and in accord
with its own values. For the latter, social institutions provide the con-
text in which we live out our personal lives, while for the former
we carry in ourselves the social forms which define our moral
responsibility.
Institutions are thus, both an unavoidable necessity of human
existence and also, forms of life for which human beings bear respon-
sibility. When Luther spoke of the Christian life in terms of "call-
ings" or "vocations", he affirmed that the individual person does not
exist apart from such an institutional context. A great distance,
however, separates us from the medieval Luther. Acquaintance with
diverse cultures, the rapid pace of social change which results in the
alteration of fundamental institutions such as marriage and family,
the reflective distance provided by anthropological and sociological
studies supplies people with a new sense of the plasticity of institu-
tional life. But the difference seems to be one of degree, not a
qualitative difference. The individual still depends upon shared and
coherent institutions to achieve stability and responsibility for life,
even though we are aware that the institutional forms are "chosen"
from a variety of possibilities.
The modern phenomenon of reflective awareness in our relation
to social institutions produces a new dimension to our moral reflec-
tion. Ethical reflection has to consider both what actions a responsi-
ble participant has to perform as tasks are defined by existing in-
stitutions and also to consider how institutions need to be changed
in order to encourage and sustain a fuller individual and communal
life. A good example of the struggle to deal with both dimensions
can be found in contemporary efforts to define what it means to be
a woman in modern Western culture.
The question of the relation of institutions to moral responsibil-
ity surfaces in two concerns of Shaffer in his lectures. One is the par-
ticular decision regarding truth-telling made by Atticus Finch. The
life of Atticus Finch was that of a "gentleman", and the life and
character of the gentleman was an institution of southern American
culture. The values and attitudes embodied in this institution required
that Atticus maintain a unity between his personal and public life.
It produced an individual of high personal integrity and a strong sense
of personal autonomy. At the same time, this institutional form pro-
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duced an elitist mentality which considered as weak persons who were
not weak at all. The example demonstrates the ambiguity of all in-
stitutional forms and the need for their constant modification in the
light of new moral insight.
In particular, Shaffer has a problem with Atticus' resolution of
the problem of truth-telling when he decides not to expose Bood
Radley's act of homicide. Truth-telling is a fundamental moral princi-
ple that should be followed even though it causes suffering. From this
perspective, it is clear what truth-telling means and the moral prob-
lem is finding the will-power to speak truthfully. For ethical thinkers
who hold a different view of how responsibility is related to social
institutions, the problem often appears the reverse. The difficulty is
not that of finding the power to speak truthfully, but that of deter-
mining what it means to be truthful in a particular situation." Being
truthful means more than speaking the facts as one best understands
them. It is also necessary to determine the right of another person
to the information in question, the appropriateness of the time and
place to relating the information, and who is entitled to speak as well
as what to say. The factual accuracy of statements made by
muckrakers, cynics and gossips does not warrant the judgment that
they have spoken truthfully. The decision of Atticus Finch has to be
evaluated in terms of institutional arrangements within which he lived,
not simply in terms of what we today might consider better institu-
tional arrangements. This does not imply that truth is arbitrarily
relative nor does it excuse manipulating the facts, but only that truth-
telling cannot be abstracted from a relational setting. It makes the
responsibility for truth-telling even more demanding, and in no way
diminishes Shaffer's insistence that the truth be told even though it
may cause suffering.
The institutional perspective outlined above affirms Shaffer's
argument for a one kingdom ethic, but it also implies a modification
that may only be an elaboration of his theory. It is possible to define
fundamental moral principles applicable to the most disparate situa-
tions: the dignity of the human person, the sanctity of life, and basic
human rights. To affirm the continuity of fundamental principles,
however, does not imply a unitary ethic in terms of rules of action.
And here the language of personal and public morality proves inade-
quate. For there are a great variety of institutionally defined rela-
tionships that allow and demand different kinds of actions by the per-
son who seeks to act responsibly. This does not imply that the cliches
20. D. Bonhoeffer, What is Meant by 'Telling the Truth'? in ETHICS 326f (1949).
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"business is business" or "that's politics" provide a moral justifica-
tion for commonly accepted practices. But a critical examination of
current practice may still recognize the need for a variety of differ-
ing definitions of moral obligation.
The institutional perspective also has relevance for Shaffer's en-
during interaction with the contemporary practice of adversary law.
The adversary system of law is a highly formalized institution. In con-
temporary practice, however, the adversary system is often understood
in terms of an adversary ethic, an anomalous ethic from which moral
concerns are often excluded. The adversary ethic tends to reduce the
relation between persons to nothing other than arbitrating and recon-
ciling conflicting interests. But here Shaffer puts his finger on a larger
social problem. Lacking any value consensus and sense of community,
people in contemporary American society tend to understand persons
primarily, sometimes almost exclusively, in terms of their interests.
Even individuals view personal life as simply "doing one's own thing"
and consider community as simply a means to enable individuals to
pursue their own private interests.
Highly formalized institutions depend, for their stability and ef-
ficacy, upon the moral web nurtured and embodied in more primary
human institutions. The state depends on social and communal values
which it cannot itself create. In the words of Reinhold Niebuhr, a peo-
ple can decide what form of government they desire, but they cannot
so easily decide to be a people. Without a more fundamental and more
comprehensive source of community and values, the formal institu-
tions may eventually collapse or produce alienated persons.
Shaffer's concern can be understood as an urgent commitment
to enlivening that larger social context. As a Christian, he can only
consider this essential. At the same time he rehearses the many
resources in our national and cultural traditions which can vitalize
and invigorate a basic moral sense. The immediate audience of his
lectures and most of his work is members of the legal profession. To
this audience he poses the question whether a lawyer can function
within the adversary system without becoming captive to the domi-
nant adversary ethic. The question remains open for him whether the
adversary ethic may become so dominant that a person dedicated to
the value of the human person could no longer engage in the practice
of law."1
In conclusion, it must be made clear where the final issue lies
21. T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER, 34, 175 (1981).
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in Shaffer's argument. The lecture is posed in terms of the contrast
between the two kingdoms and a one kingdom ethic. On these terms
it might be tempting to characterize the theme as an example of what
James Gustafson termed the "misplaced debate" between people who
want to emphasize moral principles and rules over against those who
want to emphasize the relational and situational context of moral deci-
sions. But the issue is really focused on more fundamental dimensions
of social life and legal practice. The question is whether or not basic
moral concerns are to inform the day to day practice of law and the
relationships between lawyers and clients. Here it is necessary to move
beyond the private concerns of personal conscience to actual ethical
interaction. On this point even those who would argue that one ethic
is not enough can wholeheartedly agree with Thomas Shaffer.
DALE G. LASKY
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